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ORGANIZATION (WTO) AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES (ASCM) COMMITMENTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
By  
 
Olabanji Samuel Ogunjobi  
 
With the slowing economic growth after the 2008 global recession, countries are struggling to 
energize their respective economies to boost growth and create more employment opportunities 
for their Citizens. As such, countries are taking a second look at various industrial policies to help 
restructure their respective economies. Belize, a small developing country in Central America with 
economic and political ties to the Caribbean, must expand its supply capacity to sustain its 
economy. Achieving this requires a robust institutional response through an industrial strategy 
aimed at strengthening the competitiveness of Belize’s economy. In this paper, we examine 
Belize’s existing industrial policies by conducting a legal analysis of its three investment incentive 
programs in relation to its WTO commitment. We identified the inconsistency in the three 
programmes with the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (ASCM), and observed the corrective measure undertaken by the government. Further, 
we identified possible flexibilities that Belize could take advantage of, while also suggesting a 
long-term industrial strategy that ensures an economy-wide competitiveness.   
Keywords: Industrial policy, subsidies, export contingency, international trade commitment, 








올라반지 사무엘 오군조비 
2008년 글로벌 경기침체 이후 경제성장이 둔화되면서 각국은 자국 경제에 활력을 불어넣어 
성장을 촉진하고 시민들에게 더 많은 고용기회를 창출하기 위해 고군분투하고 있다. 이와 
같이 각국은 자국 경제의 구조조정을 돕기 위해 다양한 산업정책을 재점검하고 있다. 
카리브해와 경제적, 정치적 유대를 맺고 있는 중앙아메리카의 작은 개발도상국 벨리즈는 
경제를 유지하기 위해 공급 능력을 확대해야 한다. 이를 달성하려면 벨리즈 경제의 경쟁력 
강화를 목표로 한 산업 전략을 통한 강력한 제도적 대응이 필요하다. 본 논문에서는 
벨리즈의 기존 산업정책을 검토하고, WTO의 약속을 받아 수출처리구역 프로그램에 대한 
법률 분석을 실시했다. 세계무역기구의 보조금 및 상계조치에 관한 협정(ASCM)과 
프로그램의 불일치를 확인하고, 정부가 취한 시정조치를 관찰했다. 또한, 우리는 벨리즈의 
국제 무역 공약에 대한 접근법을 조사했고, 벨리즈의 접근법은 지역주의에 달려 있다는 
것을 발견했다. 심지어 양국의 무역 참여도 지역주의 철학에서 비롯되었다. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
With the slowing economic growth after the global economic crisis in 2008, countries are 
struggling to energize their respective economies to boost growth and create more opportunities 
for their citizens. Latin America and the Caribbean, in particular, have experienced an overall 
contraction in its economy; growth declined from 5.84% post-recession in 2019, to 0.499% in 
2018 (World Bank, 2018). Thus, some developing countries, including countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, are experimenting with old industrial strategies or policies to breathe life into 
the economy (Moreno, 2015). This new look at industrial policies has since generated a growing 
number of research interests among academics as they look to see what countries who have grown 
on the back of some form of industrial policies have done (Development Centre, 2012). 
It is important to note that previous industrial strategies and policies used by countries 
existed out of the framework ushered in by the Uruguay round that led to the establishment of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO); post-1995, all trade-distorting industrial policies are subject to 
the principles of non-discrimination of the WTO thus, making their use more challenging and 
generally less effective (Ornelas & Puccio, 2019). Since these policies are now subject to the WTO 
rules, it has become imperative to examine them within the context with which they currently exist, 
especially for countries seeking to use those policies to fulfil their various industrial development 
objectives (Shadikhodjaev, 2018).  
Belize recently brought one of its three incentives regime in-line with its WTO rules on 
subsidies (Belize Trade and Industrial Development Service (BELTRAIDE), n.d.).  Belize’s 
economy is highly volatile and is susceptible to numerous external shocks, especially from its 
largest trading partners, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU) (World Trade 




resilience of the economy. Belize can achieve this through a robust institutional response to expand 
its productive capacity and strengthen the competitiveness of its private sector. A comprehensive 
industrial policy is essential to achieve such an objective. Given Belize’s uncoordinated approach 
to industrial strategy and its international commitments, mainly at the WTO, understanding its 
current approach in the context of its WTO commitments on subsidies is essential should it want 
to reorient its industrial strategy for optimum economic growth. Consequently, this research will 
examine Belize’s industrial policies in the said context, exploring the flexibilities and the lack 
thereof.  
The following questions will guide this research endeavor: 
 What are Belize’s Industrial Policies?  
 What are Belize’s Commitments to the WTO vis-à-vis its current industrial strategies? 
 What are the flexibilities inherent in those commitments? 
Section 2 of this paper will review the existing literature. Section 3 will examine the 
history of industrial development in the Caribbean and Belize. Section 4 details the existing 
industrial policies in Belize. Section 5 examines section 4 in the context of WTO commitments 













Section 2: Literature Review  
Industrial policy is arguably one of the most contentious topics in economic development. 
The disagreement is primarily because some countries have experienced tremendous economic 
growth because of industrial policies. In contrast, others such as Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Argentina, 
etc. have seen their economies take a turn for the worse as a result of the same policies. The cause 
of such disparity in the effect of industrial policies varies, depending on what side of the divide 
the policies are examined. Before we proceed, it is essential to define industrial policy; I should 
note that there is no consensus on the definition of industrial policy. However, succinctly, I define 
industrial policy as any intervention by a state to enhance the productivity of its economy or a 
particular economic sector. Other researchers are more specific in their definition, According to 
Park and Saggi (2006), and the World Bank (1993), industrial policy is any form of state 
intervention aimed at changing the production structure of a sector to enhance economic growth 
that would otherwise not occur without such intervention. The Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (as cited in Shadikhodjaev (2018)) define industrial policy 
as a government measure that enhances industrial growth and efficiency.  
Notwithstanding the broad definitions of industrial policy, industrial policies are generally 
divided into two broad areas: Horizontal industrial policies and vertical industrial policies. 
Horizontal industrial policies are primarily aimed at improving the general workings of the market, 
while vertical industrial policies are usually targeting select industries (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2016). Vertical policies historically have been the more 
contentious one, because they tend to choose winners, which leads to an overall inefficiency in the 
chosen sector – the very failure the policy sought to address in the first place (Dadush, 2016). 
Industrial Policies are also examined from two prisms, that of the protection of domestic industry 




achieve the objectives of the implementing governments. When it comes to the protection of 
industries, there are border measures such as tariffs, quotas, and trade remedy measures; while 
behind the border measures include, taxes, product standards, protection of service industries 
(Shadikhodjaev, 2018). Concerning the promotion of domestic industry, subsidies, price regimes, 
export restrictions, local content requirements, special economic zones, and development of 
industrial parks are among the instruments that governments use in their effort to boost local 
industry productivity (Shadikhodjaev, 2018).  
With the negative effect of the 2008 global economic crisis still present, countries are 
seeking new ways to boost the productivity of their economies; some developing countries and 
increasingly developed countries are dusting off old industrial strategies to help boost growth. In 
doing that, it is essential to avoid the mistakes of the past when it comes to industrial policies, 
especially vertical policies. Developing countries tend to be notoriously obsessed with boosting 
their manufacturing base using Import Substituting (IS) policy instruments. In contrast, developed 
countries tend to have a penchant for protecting dying industries such as agriculture through 
subsidies (Moreno 2015). According to Dadush (2016), a 21st Century industrial policy should 
focus less on manufacturing as it is increasingly prone to automation, which will negatively affect 
the anticipated job gains in the sector. Instead, industrial policies should focus on the services 
sector, where the potential for job retention is higher and has the opportunity to enhance the income 
of the population faster.  
 While many factors affect the success of industrial policy or strategy, a close collaboration 
with the private sector is much touted as one of the keys to an effective implementation. In this 
globalised era, industrial policy is not only to correct market failure but to encourage innovation 




the government, however, not merely by dialoguing with the private sector, but infusing 
competition for government support to encourage innovation. According to Weiss (2013), there 
should be substantive support to enhance the learning network of the private sector through trade 
fairs, trade missions, the facilitation of capital and technology importation. A group of researchers 
agree with Weiss that stakeholder consensus is crucial for maximum impact of industrial strategies 
(Ansu, Booth, Kelsall, & Williem te Velde, 2016); however, they go further in their criteria for a 
robust impact. They rightly emphasise that the identification or the establishment of an 
autonomous parastatal to coordinate a state’s industrial development approach is essential. While 
cautioning of the risks in a weak governance environment – the fact that such powers vested in 
one organisation raises old issues such as corruption, nepotism, and inadequate oversight 
synonymous with weak governance – especially in Africa.  
 Even though Belize is physically in Central America, it is part of the Caribbean 
Community’s (CARICOM) Single Market and Economy (CSME); thus, this paper will examine 
Belize’s economy from the Caribbean perspective. A study by the United Nations’ Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the efficacy of Caribbean 
industrial policy details how between the 70s and the 80s, Caribbean countries with varying 
intensities implemented IS policies primarily based on the writings of Sir Arthur Lewis, a foremost 
Caribbean thought leader in industrial development. However, Caribbean countries focused more 
on the import replacement of domestically consumed products and ignored the export promotion 
pillar of industrial development championed by Lewis. Interestingly, the path threaded by the 
region has proven to be wrong, especially since the region’s population is rather small; thus one 
wonders how the region’s economy can thrive on domestic consumption as opposed to exports, 




the Caribbean, 2001).  The same report mentions that the export contingent mix of policies 
available to countries in the past is now largely prohibited by the subsidy rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (ECLAC, 2001). In other words, drawing from the South Korean 
industrialisation experience; where at the heart of Korea’s rapid economic development were 
numerous government efforts that supported industrial development backed by aggressive export 
promotion efforts that saw a productive partnership between the fledgeling private sector and the 
government. Even though the incentives were reward-based, albeit contingent on exports – 
measures which will be inconsistent with the WTO’s agreement on subsidy and countervailing 
measures (Lim, 2014).  
In recent times, countries, including Belize, are experimenting with new approaches to 
industrial strategy. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in particular, has been frequently touted as the 
future of industrial policy. SEZs have been credited for Chinese economic growth. According to 
Zeng (2015), SEZs success in China has been primarily due to long term government commitment, 
technological upgrade, skills training, and linkages to the local economy, and of course, an 
efficient institutional framework that ensures adequate implementation. In Rwanda, SEZs are 
geared towards attracting foreign investment, especially in sectors that are mostly export-oriented. 
Notably, the manufacturing industry. More so, SEZs are favoured by the Rwandese government 
because it allows for the agglomeration of infrastructure that enhances the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector (Calabrese, Papadavid & Tyson, 2017). According to Saleman & Jordan 
(2014), Much reverberation has been experienced regarding the success or the lack thereof of 
industrial parks, especially in countries with heavy use of industrial policies for economic 
development purposes. Often, the gains from the parks or zones have disappointed the promoters 




unique implementation approach sets it apart. At the heart of the implementation is an enhanced 
private sector approach, where the leading ministry of government only provides oversight, even 
the development grants administration is largely outsourced to a competent project management 
consultant.  
In all, the effective industrial policy requires support and some level of coordination from 
the government. Gebreeyesus & Lizuka (2009) stressed the importance of the role of government 
support to emergent industries, case in point, salmon farming in Chile and floriculture in Ethiopia. 
The authors demonstrated that government must see itself more as facilitators to new industries 
with export potentials than as regulators. They argue that often, certain capacities such as cost-
sharing for capital intensive industries and coordination support, especially concerning the 
importance of knowledge is essential to the eventual success of new industries. Ultimately infant 
industries need financial space to experiment, which might be costly to the market; and as have 
been observed in the case of Chile and Ethiopia, that early support from the state go a long way in 
picking winners. In the Caribbean, the creative industry is one of the emergent sectors that is 
attracting government attention. Given that the creative industry presents new opportunities for 
economic growth in the region, Caribbean leaders have encouragingly started articulating options 
of developing the sector by way of financing incentives to de-risk financing for the sector. 
However, little progress has been made thus far (Hendrickson, Lugay, Caldentey, Mulder, & 
Alvarez, 2012). 








Section 3: History of industrial development in the Caribbean and Belize  
 The Caribbean has historically been agrarian; indeed, that was the primary purpose of their 
establishment by colonialists. As such, it is no surprise the foundation of the economy of the region 
was based on agricultural exports. Tourism, the current mainstay of the region’s economy is 
reasonably recent. Cash crops such as sugar, coffee, banana, citrus have always dominated the 
commercial agricultural industry of the region. The renowned Caribbean economist, Arthur Lewis 
advocated for industrialisation – a move away from the traditional agricultural sector which he 
contended was not as productive as the potential gains from manufacturing.  
 Rhiney (2016), mentioned that opposing scholars would later arise in the 70s to argue that 
such intense focus on exports was weakening the competitiveness of the Caribbean, especially its 
agricultural sector. As such, protectionist measures were implemented albeit at a very high cost 
that pushed countries in the region to undergo the Bretton Wood institutions structural adjustment 
programs in the 80s. The intervention saw the liberalisation of the Caribbean economies that 
included the reduction of the state support to local farmers and the rise in food imports initially to 
meet the growing demand from the increasingly expanding tourism industry.  
 Due to colonial ties to European powers, the sugar-producing Caribbean countries have 
long enjoyed preferential market access to the European market through its then sugar quota by 
way of the Lome Convention (Mitchell, 2005). This system invariably meant that European 
consumers had to pay more for sugar due to the quota-program – in the face of more efficient 
imports from low-cost sugar-producing countries. The WTO trade rules which eliminated the 
banana and sugar preferences of Caribbean countries have seen the sugar industry, in particular, 
become uncompetitive in the face of other, perhaps more efficient producers in Latin America. 
Invariably the reduced earnings from agriculture made it necessary for the governments of the 




basic economic development pattern from agrarian to a service dominated economy even though 
the middle stage of light manufacturing seemed to have been skipped by the region. 
Belize 
 Smith (2013), in his book “a history of enterprise in Belize”, details the development of 
various industry in Belize:  
 
Figure 1: Belize's industrial evolution 
The first real enterprise in the then British-Honduras (now Belize) was the extraction of 
logwood in the 1600s. Initially being stolen from the Spaniards by the English Buccaneers, and 
subsequently extracted by the English through the increased use of African labour. Over time, the 




more sophistication than what was needed for logwood. Till date, Belize continues to extract 
mahogany and other kinds of luxury trees such as rosewood, even though stymied due to 
environmental concerns (Llewellyn, 2012).  
 While it appears from figure 1 that agriculture had also always been part of the economic 
make-up of Belize, it was until after the second world war that the country’s economy began 
shifting focus to agriculture as a result of investment by locals and Americans. It is noteworthy 
that the Mayan natives of Belize had been an agrarian society and planted corn, avocadoes, 
tomatoes etc. to sustain their society long before the arrival of the Spaniards or the English settlers. 
As such, capital and land were the contribution of the settlers to the expansion of the agricultural 
sector of Belize pre-independence.  
 Industrial policies to sustain the sector did not truly emerge until after independence in the 
early 80s. Government participation in the industry had been limited not by way of policy, but of 
capacity to the approval of seeds that ensures better yields (Smith 2013).  
 As was the economic development experience of other Caribbean nations, it appears as 
well, that Belize skipped the light manufacturing to the manufacturing stage of economic 
development into services while trying to ensure that its agricultural sector remained vibrant. Even 
as the service industry’s significance became pronounced over time, sugar, banana, and citrus saw 
improved competitiveness and sustained Belize’s exports to date. The banana industry was also 
affected by the WTO judgement against the European Union’s preferential banana regime (World 
Trade Organization , 2012).  
 As with the rest of the Caribbean, the 80s saw the true genesis of the development of the 
tourism industry – the bulwark of Belize’s services industry. Up till the 80s, the agro-industry had 




but gradually until the early 90s, where the government began the process of organising players in 
the industry. The Belize Tourism Board (BTB) was thus constituted in 1996. Majority of visitors 
came from the United States and Canada – it was more accessible given the proximity of Belize to 
North America despite colonial ties to the United Kingdom. Also, there was a concerted 
government effort to promote Belize as a prime tourism destination on major television outlets in 

























Section 4: Industrial Policies in Belize  
With 20 countries receiving 70% of the global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in 
2016 (Obiols, 2018), it automatically means the remaining 175 countries must compete for 30% 
of what is left; setting up an aggressive battle of wits and creativity to get the most attention, and 
ultimately, the most investment. Clearly, the investors are the bride, while the countries are the 
suitors. With more suitors than the bride, their primary objectives become, initially, to attract the 
most positive attention that will ultimately lead to being chosen. With each country blessed with a 
varying degree of natural assets, including human capital, sometimes, similar, countries use 
investment incentives to enhance the value of their offerings.  
Belize, being the smallest economy in Central America with a GDP of USD 1.8 billion 
(Central Bank of Belize, 2020), must compete with the rest of the world for investments to grow 
its economy.  To do that, given its small size, the government must be creative in marketing itself 
to investors while not engaged in a race to the regulatory bottom to the detriment of the long-term 
economic interest of the country. Indeed, Belize has investment incentives aimed at showcasing 
its strength to investors. The investment incentives of Belize are the framework of its industrial 
policy, and it is illustrative of the government’s economic aspirations through select priority 
sectors.  
4.1 Regional  
Basically, the industrial policy of Belize flows from the Community Industrial Policy, 
which flows from the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) (2001); that understanding is key in 
the description of the industrial policy landscape of Belize. The integration movement in the 
Caribbean started in the late 50s, from the short-lived West Indies federation, to the Free Trade 
association, and finally the original treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 by Jamaican, Barbados, 




English-speaking Caribbean gained independence, the joined the community, culminating into the 
revision of the treaty in 2001 to establish the single market and economy. CARICOM’s integration 
is hinged on economic integration, foreign policy coordination, human and social development, 
and security (CARICOM Secretariat , 2020).  
Chapter 4, Part one of the RTC, explains the objective and the implementation of the 
community industrial policy for the region. Article 51 notes the goal of the policy to be market-
oriented, and the competitive production of goods and services to support the region’s economic 
growth. Paragraph 2 of Article 51 states the following objectives for Member States in 
implementing the policy:  
a. sustainable use of natural and human resources across the region to expand 
productive capacity 
b. intentional development of linkages between the economic sectors of the CSME 
Member states  
c. promotion of regional champions that can help the region achieve scales of 
production to enhance the competitiveness of regional industries 
d. development of a vibrant Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) 
e. embedded diversification approach to the production of goods and services for both 
the internal market and exports 
f. efficient partnership between the private sector and the public sector for efficient 
production of goods and services  
g. development of green industries  
h. strike continuous balance between economic needs and social needs while 




i. stable labour relations across economic sectors (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001)  
Without industrial development, there would be nothing to trade. As such, industrial 
development and trade development go together. However, in Belize, the coordination has been 
lacking, as such, harmonizing the industrial strategy is essential. Outside of Article 51 of the RTC, 
Article 164 of the RTC about the promotion of industrial development is another legal impetus for 
industrial policy in the region, which applies to Belize. Article 164 supports CARICOM Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) in order to promote their respective manufacturing sectors with tariff 
waivers and technical assistance from the more developed Member States (Government of Belize, 
2019; US Department of State, 2019).  
The Article 164 makes particular provisions for the suspension of community origin rules 
for the importation of inputs aimed at the promotion of identified industries with extensive linkages 
to the rest of the economy. In Belize, agro-processing economic activities such as, the processing 
of meat, pepper, and its sauces, cheese, milk, ice cream, animal feed etc. form part of the 
Government of Belize’s effort to diversity its export basket to reduce the susceptibility of the 
economy to external shock synonymous to mono-product economies. Even though, the 
government is increasingly paying attention to export diversification, the need for a unified 
industrial policy to guide industrial policy for Belize cannot be overemphasized. (Government of 
Belize, 2019).  
4.2 National  
As noted previously, the Government of Belize is cognizant of the importance of export 
diversification due to shocks the economy has experienced when demand reduces from its primary 
export markets. Thus, ensuring the ease of business environment is key to facilitating increased 
investment, diversification of exports. Consequently, the government of Belize, apparently, is 




enhance technology transfer. To ensure all these activities aimed at attracting investments, there 
are three investment incentives programs Belize has put in place to boost its industrial aspirations. 
Those programs form the basis of Belize’s industrial policy thrust, and thus suffices for the purpose 
of this research endeavor.  
They are the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), Free Zones (FZs), and Fiscal Incentive 
programmes. The common benefit of these programs are duty and tax concessions. These 
programmes have been instrumental thus far in the diversification of Belize’s exports and services 
sector. 
Belize Government is working on harmonizing these investment programs to make them 
consistent with its international obligations.  
4.3 The fiscal incentive programme  
This programme is governed by the fiscal incentive act of 1990, and it is one of many 
schemes the government of Belize implemented to attract investments to the country. The acts 
feature the fiscal incentives and the regulations and rules governing the investment. It defines fiscal 
incentives as tax holidays and duty exemptions granted to qualified businesses. For tax holidays, 
the fiscal incentive act details the benefits and conditions of the tax holiday period. The tax 
holidays period shall be for 5 years. In addition, there is an exception that for businesses in 
agriculture, agro-industrial products etc., with a labour-intensive operation and export oriented, 
should enjoy the benefits for the program for a minimum of 25 years. The incentive under the 
clause also allows for exemptions from income tax obligations.   
 Companies who have been granted an Approved Enterprise Order (AEO) under the 
regulations are exempted from duty payments on imports to duties on the following items:  
a. Building materials, plants, machinery, equipment including specialized tools, 




b. Spare parts for the plant and plant-related machinery and agricultural machinery; 
and  
c. Any raw materials or other items for the sole of use of approved enterprise.  
The Fiscal Incentives Program is managed by the Belize Trade and Investment Development 
Service (BELTRAIDE), a statutory body under the Ministry with responsibility for Investment, 
Trade, and Commerce. 
4.4 Commercial Free Zone Programme  
The Commercial Free Zone programme’s is governed by the commercial free zone (FZ) 
act of 1994. The zone offers facilities for various manufacturing, processing, packaging, 
warehousing, and distribution of goods and services. Supplies warehoused in the FZ may be 
wholesaled and sold to diplomats who by the virtue of international law are not required to pay 
duty for foreign imports. Transactions with ships that dock at Belizean ports even though destined 
for other ports, and the sale of direct exports by any of Belize’s borders are exempted from duties, 
as long as those goods are sold in bulk; however, these goods, should they enter into national 
customs territory must pay the necessary customs duty (ambergriscaye.com, n.d.). 
Duty free goods can only be delivered at the point of departure. Inside the FZ, businesses 
located within can trade with one another so long as there is appropriate record of such transaction. 
Equally, in the FZ, there is no restriction on foreign exchange transactions, and businesses 
operating in the zone are able to open foreign current account with any bank, duly registered, 
located within the zone.  
The Rent Restriction Act shall also not apply to real estate transactions in the zone. As with 
the fiscal incentives programme, there are also exemptions and tax holidays for businesses 




a. Imports entering the zone are exempted from custom duties and other 
charges 
b. Fuels, building materials, furniture and sundry are exempt from import 
duties and other charges 
c. There is no quota restriction of any goods imported into the zone by a FZ 
business 
d. The ingress and egress of the goods that enter the zone do not require 
import or export license 
e. Goods from the zone that is destined for entrance into the national customs 
territory are subject to the import duty and other charges payment 
(ambergriscaye.com, n.d.)   
4.5 Export Processing Zone Programme  
The Export Processing Zone (EPZs) program was designed with the objective to facilitate 
foreign investors to boost the exports of new industries. The programme was also expected to 
facilitate technology transfer that will ultimately spill-over into the national customs territory; this 
would encourage high quality production of goods, enhanced technical managerial skills in 
addition to creating needed employment for the youths of the country (Belize Investment Guide, 
2020). Belize’s EPZ program is particularly attractive to investors given its preferential market 
access to major export markets; the entire community market of CARICOM, the European Union 
(EU) through the Lome Convention (European Union, 2020), Canada under the Caribbean-Canada 
Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN), the United States (US) through the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
and its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  




a. Import and export duty exemptions with extensions to capital and intermediate goods 
to be used by EPZ business 
b. EPZ businesses are exempted from capital gains, land and property tax. They are also 
exempted from sales and consumption tax etc.  
c. The duration of the benefits is 20 years with possibility for extension 
d. EPZ businesses are equally exempt from dividend taxes in perpetuity 
e. EPZ businesses are able to open foreign currency bank accounts unlike business 
domiciled within the national customs territory 
f. Imports by EPZ business require no import license, equally these businesses do not 
require trade licenses to operate within the zone 
g. In the zone, the Supplies Control Act alongside its regulations does not apply 
(ambergriscaye.com, n.d.).  
Unlike the fiscal incentives programme, the EPZ is administered by the Investment Policy and 
Compliance Unit (IPCU) of the Ministry with responsibility for Investment, Trade and Commerce.  
4.6 The Designated Processing Area Programme  
The EPZ from its name is sure to raise the dust of opposition from WTO members given 
the overt export contingency of the program. As such, the Government of Belize was obliged to 
reform the programme. It did so through the repeal of the EPZ act and replaced it with the 
Designated Processing Area (DPA) Act of 2018. The DPA act among other changes, removed the 
export contingency contained in the EPZ act. The DPA programme’s primary objectives are to 
facilitate and enable new investments in value-adding enterprises in Belize’s national economic 
priority sectors, while of course, generating employment and maintaining the environmental 




A company operating within a DPA must fulfil obligation stipulated in the act. Such 
company is required to bear the cost of administration of the DPA; the company must also meet 
the sanitary and phytosanitary requirements of Belize as stipulated in the Belize Agricultural 
Health Authority Act. Part of the DPA act also requires companies operating within the area to 
maintain an efficient, be it physical or electronic, records of inventory, production of sale of goods 
and services for inspection by the authorities when needed.  
In the DPA, companies must ensure that 85 per cent of employed persons within the 
organization are Belizeans or CARICOM citizens. Nationals of countries other than Belize and 
CARICOM can only be employed in senior management or technical positions. Should an 
approved DPA company desire to change the nature of approved activities, it must seek permission 
from the DPA Committee (DPAC) according to the DPA act. Equally under this DPA regime, 
companies operating within the region must keep records of inventory and financials for inspection 
from time to time by the authorities.   
As with the EPZ programme, the DPA programme is also administered by the IPCU of the 












Section 5: Existing industrial policies in the context of Belize's WTO ASCM 
commitments 
This section will examine the previous section within the context of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). We will examine the inconsistencies of the three 
incentive programmes of Belize, including particular examination of the difference between the 
repealed EPZ act and the new DPA act. 
 As explained in the section 2 of this paper, governments, both of developing and developed 
countries are continuously seeking ways to boost economic growth. In developing countries, much 
of that effort is geared towards the development of new industries. Subsidies are known to be one 
of the ways to help governments meet their various industrial development objectives. Evidently, 
the capacity of each government to provide subsidy to its industries according to their respective 
national priority varies by the fiscal strength to do so. The amount of subsidy that an OECD country 
can muscle to protect or promote an industry would not be same as the amount a developing 
country, say from the Caribbean can do. As such, the effect of the subsidy on the global market 
also varies. Where a subsidy by a country distorts competition in an industry, competing supplying 
countries, indeed, the countries which are unable able to match the amount of subsidy being 
provided by the economically well-off country, will complain about the lack of fairness that the 
Multilateral trading system promises.  
 Consequently, the three primary incentive programmes Belize operates are a form of 
subsidy; because they seek to develop industry through various benefits that would otherwise not 
be available to firms in the country. Investment incentive programs such as those described are 
subject to Belize’s international trade obligations, especially its commitment to the WTO. It is 




 The ASCM is the agreement that governs the acceptable use of subsidy by members of the 
WTO. It forms part of the Annex 1A of the WTO agreement thus indicating that all members of 
the WTO are subject to its provisions. The agreement also, provides guidelines in respect to the 
acceptable approach when counteracting the effect of said subsidy in a Member State’s market.  
 In defining subsidy, the ASCM, succinctly, subscribes the definition of subsidy to be any 
financial contribution by a government or its agent, where such contribution confers benefit to the 
receiving firm, or industry. The financial contribution by government can take various forms such 
as actual direct transfer of funds, forgone government revenue, provision of goods and services 
that would otherwise not have been provided, or the contribution to mechanism by a government, 
and any form of income or price support as defined in Article XVI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
Also, in really understanding the nitty-gritty of the definition of subsidy, we are prudent to 
understand that not all financial contribution by a government or its agents confers benefit to its 
recipient. It is the combination of the financial contribution and benefit that constitutes a subsidy 
within the meaning of Article 1.1(a) and (b) of the ASCM. The distinction between what a financial 
contribution and benefit was further emphasized in Brazil – Aircraft1, where the Appellate Body 
(AB) stressed their difference and noted that, it is the combination of it that constitutes a subsidy 
according to Article 1.1 of the ASCM. The same sentiment was echoed in US – Softwood Lumber 
IV2, where the AB notes that Article 1 of the ASCM pictured a situation in which an economic 
advantage is experienced by firm or industry consequent upon a financial contribution by a 
government or its agents is deemed a subsidy.   
                                                            
1  Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 20 August 1999, para. 
157 
2  Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain 




For our purpose in this paper, we note that Belize’s three investment incentives program 
are all administered by a Ministry or an agency of government as stipulated in the respective 
enabling legislations, as such the transfer of economic value under Belize’s subsidies regime is 
consistent with Article 1.1(a)(1). As mentioned earlier, Article 1, paragraph 1(a) is not enough to 
assume a subsidy exists. The tax holiday, and duty exemption helps businesses save cost and 
reinvest in much needed areas of growth, it also enhances the competitiveness of such businesses. 
Surely, these assistances are bound to benefit the recipient company thus completing our definition 
of what can and cannot be considered a subsidy. Since the benefit obtained through Belize’s 
investment incentive programmes by authorized companies are in form tax holidays and duty 
exemptions, it follows that those programmes legally fit the purpose of our inquiry.  
Article 1.2 of the ASCM notes that subsidy as defined in Article 1.1 must be subject to the 
provision of Part II, or Part III or Part V of the ASCM only if the subsidy meets the specificity test 
laid out in Article 2 of the ASCM. A subsidy shall be deemed to be specific if access to it is limited 
to an enterprise or a group of enterprises, or even location as per Article 2.1 of the ASCM. The 
limitation must be as a result of the legislation of the programme. Specificity is deemed to be 
absent if the granting authority utilizes an objective criterion in determining access to said subsidy. 
For Belize, its three investment subsidy regimes contain exports contingencies, which are 
prohibited subsidies as per Part II of the ASCM, and would automatically be deemed to be specific 
in accordance with Article 1.2 of the ASCM. Belize’s CFZ could be deemed to be specific under 
Article 2.2 of the ASCM as its benefits are limited to geographical location. The AB in US – 
Washing Machines3 establishes that Article 2.2 concerns the particular locations of the enterprises 
                                                            
3Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on large Residential Washers 




benefiting from said subsidy. Further, in US – Countervailing Measure (21.5 – China)4, the Panel 
agreed with the US Department of Commerce’s regional specificity determination requirement 
that the subsidy could only be obtained in an economic zone – the procedure differs outside of the 
zone. The subsidy in this case was the conditionalities attached to land provision in an economic 
zone in China. As is with Belize, a CFZ is a designated area, according to Section 6 of the Free 
Zones Act, within Belize to fulfil the objective of the programme. 
The above definition as per Article 1.1 of the ASCM must be understood alongside Article 
2, which speaks to the specificity of the subsidy. In that, for a financial contribution to be 
considered a subsidy within the meaning of the definition article, such benefit must be specific to 
a firm or a group of firms. Geographical specification also falls within the scope of subsidy 
specificity as stated in the second paragraph of article 2 of the ASCM.  
 Section 9 of the EPZ act speaks to the process of import and export into the EPZ. 
Subsection 2 of section 9 states that all imports of an approved EPZ business are exempt from all 
customs duties, tariffs, taxes etc. The importation of fuel for the purpose of energy generation is 
exempted from taxes. Section 6 of the Fiscal Incentive (FI) Act, alongside section 7 of the same 
act details the tax holiday, duty exemption the government, under the programme, extends to 
approved companies. Equally, the Commercial Free Zones (CFZ) Act’s section 19, and 27 speaks 
to the duty exemptions available to CFZ companies, alongside the tax regime that is operational 
in the zone respectively.  The scope of the described benefit in the three subsidies programme of 
Belize fit into the definition of subsidy as contained in the ASCM.  
 Evidently, the three investment incentive programmes of Belize, indeed, meets the 
definition of subsidy as per Article 1 of the ASCM. The CFZ programme, of the three programmes, 
                                                            
4  Panel Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on certain products from China, WT/DS437/RW, 




appear to be the least contentious vis-à-vis Belize’s obligations under the ASCM, even though one 
section in the act is also inconsistent with the ASCM due to some element of export performance 
conditionalities. Sections of the FI programme entails some export performance conditions, which 
puts it at crossroads with the ASCM as well. The nomenclature of the EPZ says all an observer 
needs to assume about its provisions being riddled with export performance conditions. The FI and 
especially the EPZ from its name, connotes a contingency that falls under the purview of Part II, 
Article 3 of the ASCM, which speaks to prohibited subsidies. The article reads that subsidies 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the ASCM, contingent de facto or de jure, on the performance 
of exports solely or alongside other conditions, including conditions contained in the Annex I, 
which contains the list of illustrative export subsidies, of the ASCM are not to be used by WTO 
Members.  
 In Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees5, proving export conditionality according to 
Article 3.1(a) requires that said subsidy to have been established within Article 1 of the ASCM as 
we have earlier done in this section. In other words, export contingency cannot be proved without 
the actual existence of subsidy. The prohibition of export subsidies was further confirmed by the 
AB in US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)6. Export subsidies according to Article 3.1(a) of the ASCM 
should either de jure or de facto be dependent on export performance. De jure in the sense that the 
wording of the legislation that give effect to the subsidy should include such conditionality; this 
interpretation was confirmed in Canada – Autos7AB report. We would see in our analysis of 
Belize’s FI act and EPZ act the explicit export performance requirement.   
                                                            
5Panel Report, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R, adopted 19 
February 2002, para. 7.16 
6 Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporation” Recourse to Article 21.5 
of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, adopted 29 January 2002, para. 111 
7 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R 




 When it comes to de facto export contingency, we mean that though not explicit in wording 
in a legislation, regulation or policy, in practice, there is a conditionality that requires beneficiary 
of a subsidy to be engaged in some form of export-related activities. As noted in footnote 4 of the 
ASCM, the simple fact that an exporting firm benefits from a subsidy should not be construed to 
confirm the existence of an export subsidy according to Article 3. However, if such subsidy is even 
remotely tied to expected export earnings of the receiving firm, we can infer that, in fact, the 
granting of said subsidy has been made conditional to export. This analysis was equally buttressed 
by the AB in Canada – Aircraft, and also in EC and certain member States – Large Civil Aircraft8; 
where export conditionality could be inferred from the full body of facts meeting some 
requirements. We find the third factor, which speaks to the essential factual circumstances 
pertaining to the granting of said subsidy to be more relevant to our analysis of the CFZ act, where 
the export contingency in the act is not stated but inferred. A section of the FI act, as we will see 
below equally contains a provision that is de facto an export contingency.  
Even though the second paragraph of Article 3 of the ASCM makes no distinction between 
developed and developing countries when it comes to being able to grant nor maintain prohibited 
subsidies, article 27 of the ASCM makes provision for special and differential treatment for 
developing countries. In particular, paragraph 1(a) of article 3, shall not apply to specific Member 
States listed in Annex VII of the ASCM. Other developing country Members are mandated to 
phase out measures within the definition of Article 3 of the ASCM within eight (8) years of entry 
into force of the Agreement; with annual extension subject to the consultation with the committee 
with responsibility for the ASCM at the WTO. Since Belize is not listed in Annex VII, but 
nonetheless a developing country, it is paragraph 2(b) of article 27 of the ASCM that applies to it. 
                                                            
8 Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures affecting trade in Large 




Consequently, the export contingencies identified in the three incentive programmes should have 
had to have been eliminated by 2003 per the stipulated 8 years.  
Belize, as is required by article 27, paragraph 4 of the ASCM, continues to request the 
continuation of the extension for exemption on prohibited subsidies, with the last record of such 
request in 20189.  A General Council (GC) decision10 on Article 27, paragraph 4 of the ASCM on 
the 27 July 2007 put a deadline to the extension of the exemption for prohibited subsidies for non-
Annex VII countries. All subsidies within the definition of Article 3 of the ASCM were to be 
phased-out by affected countries by 31 December 2015, upon the implementation of action plans 
by Member states developed by members to give effect to the GC decision. 
Even though the authorities in Belize, in its 2017 secretariat’s report on its third Trade 
Policy Review (World Trade Organization , 2017), note that most beneficiaries of the FI 
programme are not exporters; sections of the FI act contain provisions that is tantamount to export 
contingency thereby making it inconsistent with the ASCM. Section 3 of the FI act speaks to the 
requirement for the application of order from the Minister to benefit from the FI. Subsection 1, 
paragraph (d) of the FI act requires that the applying company provides to the Minister through 
the Chairman of BELTRAIDE, information that will facilitate the determination of the levels of 
export, foreign exchange earnings or savings the company expects to generate. While the simple 
fact of an exporting subsidy obtaining subsidy is not in itself considered an export subsidy, the 
conditioning of obtaining such subsidy on export would meet the export contingency test of article 
3 of ASCM. What makes this particular section problematic is that the requested information 
reveals the export abilities of a company – one is left to wonder what happens if the applying 
                                                            
9 New and Full Notification pursuant to Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Belize, G/SCM/N/299/BLZ/Rev.1 G/SCM/N.315/BLZ, circulated 26 February 2018 




company has no export potential. Such ambiguity gives too much discretion that could be used to 
as an export contingent.   
Section 6 of the FI act states that the tax holiday an approved company could be entitled to 
should, under normal circumstance not be beyond five (5) years from the date of production with 
a possibility of a further ten (10) extension according to subsection 1. Paragraph (b) of the said 
subsection allows for a tax holiday for a maximum of twenty-five (25) years provided the company 
is engaged in select sectors, whose production is solely for exports. Therein lies the export 
contingency of Section 6 of the FI act  
Section 7 of the FI act also contains an explicit export contingency that makes it 
inconsistent with the ASCM as per its article 3. Section 7 of the FI act speaks to duty exemption 
due to an approved company. Its subsection 1, paragraph (a) allows approved company to have 
duty exemption of not more than fifteen (15) years; paragraph (b) on the other hand, allows for a 
maximum of 25 years duty exemption for companies whose production is solely for exports. Again, 
here, there exist a de facto violation of the ASCM under its article 3. Evidently, the FI act as is, 
requires an amendment by parliament to make it consistent with Belize’s obligation under the 
ASCM.  
The Free Zones Act 2005 governs the CFZ programme of Belize. Section 19, subsection 
10 of the speaks to under what conditions goods from the CFZ can enter into the national customs 
territory. Further, paragraph (a) requires the approval of the ministry of Finance before a sale can 
be made to the national custom territory. If such approval is given by the Ministry, that sale to the 
national customs territory must not exceed 25% of imports of a CFZ business or 25% of the 
produced within the CFZ by the company. The percentage limitation intentionally limits the 




better available for exports.  This numerical limitation is glaringly an export contingent that is in 
violation of the ASCM.  
 The benefits conferred in the EPZ programme, for the purpose of this research, is not in 
question. The conditions attached to those benefits form the basis of the inquiry. Section 7, 
subsection 3(a) of the EPZ act, which details that the certificate of compliance to operate an EPZ 
business should be granted to a firm only if such firm operates a business that engages in the 
production of good and/or services specifically for exports except waived by the Ministry with 
responsibility for EPZ as stated in section 8, subsection 3 of the EPZ act.  
 Even though the EPZ developer could lease property within the zone to a non-exporting 
firm, only if the firm’s business is complementary to the activities of the exporting firms in the 
zone. This provision is according to subsection 5 of the EPZ act; even though, the part of the act 
allows for non-exporting firms’ operation, such an allowance is still contingent on service supply 
to exporting firms thus making the act inconsistent with the ASCM.  
 The inconsistency of the provisions of the EPZ with Belize’s obligation to the WTO is 
glaring; and haven undergone three trade policy review by the WTO, it was clear it was time to 
bring the incentive programs – a cornerstone of its fragmented industrial policy thrust - in-line 
with its international trade obligations. That other Member States have not brought a formal 
complaint against Belize, before the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, is not enough reason 
to maintain such law if Belize intended to continue to be a responsible member of the Multilateral 
Trading System (MTS).  
 Consequently, the government began working to reform the program, and in 2018 repealed 
the EPZ Act of 2000. The repealed act was replaced with what is known as the Designated 




repealed EPZ act, albeit with some adjustments. Part V, section 18 of the act speaks to the duration 
of conferred benefit. The duration of the benefit granted to a business with a DPA status does not 
exceed ten (10) years, which is a reduction from the 20 years provided for in the repealed EPZ act. 
More so, action to subsection of 4 of section 18 of the DPA, should a firm for a renewal of a DPA 
status, such firm would be ineligible for all the benefits, and the duration of the renewed benefit 
shall not be up to the initial 10 years.  
This streamlining of benefits can be said to be consistent with global best practices in 
relation to government industrial support, and the government counting the cost of the programme 
in the long term. The non-automatic renewal of benefit also infuses a graduation element into the 
new act, which minimises the culture of dependency among firms in Belize. 
The consequential change that the DPA act brought to the EPZ act is the removal of the 
export contingency contained in the act. This was achieved through Part III, Section 8, which 
specifies process for obtaining a DPA status and what the act deems as approved activities in the 
DPA. The said section grants DPA status benefit to approved firms who operate in sectors the 
minister with responsibility for DPA (Minister with responsibility for Investment Trade and 
Commerce) declares a national priority sector. This declaration should be in accordance with a 
national development plan or any other government policy. As such, a firm with a DPA status firm 
need not be in an export-oriented business; such firm only need to be operating a national priority 
sector.  
In addition, Section 9, subsection 6(a) of the DPA act, empowers the DPA Committee 
(DPAC) to refuse the application of a DPA status should the activities of that firm be determined 




competition law into the incentive program – this is noteworthy since Belize does not currently 
have a legal framework to address antitrust issues.  
With the DPA act, Belize has been able to bring one of its three-incentive program, in 
particular, the EPZ programme, to be consistent with the ASCM. While, the remaining two 
continue to be inconsistent with the provisions of the ASCM as there have not been any amendment 
to the FI act, and the CFZ act to that effect as at the end of this study. The continuous existence of 
the FI and CFZ act as is, is in fact, contrary to the spirit of Belize 2018 Notification under Article 
27, paragraph 4 of the ASCM in 2018., especially since these export subsidies should have ceased 
to exist in its current form since 2015 per the General Councils’ 2007 decision.   
 As we opined in section 2, the array of industrial policies that were available to now-
industrialized countries such as South Korea, in the 70s and 80s are no longer available to 
developing countries such as Belize. The international disciplines surrounding industrial 
promotion have evolved to one that is deemed to be fairer in that, there is next to no market 
distortion in its effect. As we have clearly seen from our analysis of the ASCM, the use of subsidies 
that are contingent on export performance are prohibited thus limiting the targeting abilities of 
industrial policymakers in developing countries. And with limited fiscal wiggle room, the 
bluntness of targeting by the new rules of subsidies makes developing countries’ efforts at 
developing industry less effective.  
 The General Council’s 2007 decision on the phase-out of all export contingent subsidies 
by December 2015 removed the flexibility of countries like Belize had enjoyed in its industrial 
promotion efforts. Though, as we have indicated earlier, two of the three investment incentive acts 
Belize operates are still inconsistent with the ASCM. Despite this, the new DPA act is 




repealed EPZ act haven been removed, yet, the benefits as we mentioned earlier have largely 
remained the same. If the export conditionality of the two remaining inconsistent legislation can 
also be addressed, then all three programs would be consistent with the ASCM. However, the 
consistency of all three acts with the ASCM would mean that there will be almost no difference 
between the programs as the benefits enjoyed by approved companies are similar. As such, maybe 
a consolidation of the three programs into one mega investment incentive program with the 
existing differences in the three programmes as sections in a comprehensive programme, could be 
a prudent action by the Government of Belize – it might even lead to a more efficient 
administration of the programmes.  
 The declaration of an economic sector as national priority by the Minister with 
responsibility for DPA allows Belize to remove the export conditionality of the benefits of the 
programme. We note that the minister could by his or her own analysis or consequent upon a 
national development plan, declare sector with rich export capability or potential as national 
priority, thereby according such sector, the benefits of the DPA programme. This approach 
somewhat allows Belize to continue to meet its industrial development aspirations through an 
effective investment incentive program and fulfil its international trade obligations as well.  
 Further, while the DPA is consistent with the ASCM, we note that there is a possibility of 
it being subject to challenge by member States of the WTO if its effect on other member States is 
adverse according to Article 5 and 6 of the ASCM, which speak to subsidies not being detrimental 
to the interest of other Members of the WTO. However, we are cognizant of the small size of 
Belize’s economy and its inherent supply capacity constraints even with its market access to 




effect of the DPA, or the eventual reform of the FI and CFZ programmes will be detrimental to 
the interest of another member State within the meaning of Articles 5 and 6 of the ASCM.  
 We note the provisions of Article 8 of the ASCM, and the possibility of non-actionable 
subsidies that Belize could use in furthering its industrial development. However, in practice, 
Article 31 of the ASCM states that the provisions of Article 6, paragraph 1, and entirety of the 
provisions of Articles 8 and 9 of the ASCM would apply for a period no later than five (5) of the 
entry into force of the agreement establishing the WTO. As such, the flexibility inherent in Article 



















Section 6: Conclusion and Recommendation  
 The research sought to conduct a legal analysis of Belize’s industrial policies in the context 
of its WTO commitments, in particular, those policies against the provisions of the ASCM. In 
doing so, the following research questions was used to guide the examination: (a) what are Belize’s 
industrial policies? (b) what is Belize’s commitment to the WTO vis-à-vis its current industrial 
strategies? (c) what were the inherent flexibilities or the lack thereof. We thus aimed to describe 
and assess Belize’s primary industrial policies, which we identified to be: (a) Fiscal Incentive 
program (b) Commercial Free Zone Program (c) Export Processing Zone program (d) Designated 
Processing Area program.  In doing so, we observed that the investment incentives programmes 
are the framework of Belize’s industrial policy. More so, that Belize’s industrial policy stems from 
the community industrial policy found in the RTC.  
 In answering the second research question, we examined the provisions of the legislation 
backing the three-investment incentive program of Belize, and sought to identify the inconsistency 
that exist therein with the ASCM. For the three programmes, upon analysis, we observed that the 
basis of inconsistency with the ASCM, lies in the export contingency contained in sections of those 
legislations. We defined export contingency as when the access to said subsidy is conditional on 
the export performance of the firm. We note that the EPZ’s nomenclature and provisions were 
overtly contingent on export performance as only businesses engaged in export activities could 
operate in an EPZ, and where non-export business were present, those businesses must be engaged 
in export complementary services in the zone. This requirement outrightly makes the program 
illegal according to article 3 of the ASCM, where subsidies dependent on export performance is 




 We examined government’s effort to make the EPZ program consistent with its 
international trade commitment and observed the repeal of the government act of the EPZ and the 
enactment of the new DPA act in 2018.  Section 8 of the new legislation removed the export 
contingency requirement and replaced it with businesses operating in national priority sectors as 
ordered by the Minister with responsibility for DPA. The national priority sector need not be an 
export-oriented sector. The scope of the benefit in the new act remained largely the same with 
minor amendments such as, the reduction of overall duration of benefit to 10 years from the 
previous 20 years as was in the EPZ act. The renewal of benefits was equally subject to conditions 
where, even if benefits were renewed, the entirety of initial benefits may not be renewed. 
Consequently, we note that while the provisions of the ASCM blunts the efficacy of Belize’s 
industrial policy efforts, notwithstanding the inherent fiscal constraints Belize faces, through the 
DPA act, Belize sought to balance its domestic interest with its international commitments.  
 We note that no changes regarding export contingency has been made to the CFZ and FI 
acts. Consequently, as of the period of our inquiry, those programmes are still inconsistent with 
the ASCM. Belize, while having taken steps to bring its investment incentive program in 
conformity with its commitment under the ASCM, and its consistent assurance to the General 
Council of the WTO of its desire to abide by the 2007 decision, is has still not complied. We 
therefore note the illegality of two of Belize’s three investment incentive programmes as per its 
ASCM commitment.  
 In addressing the third research question regarding the inherent flexibilities of Belize’s 
ASCM commitment, we recognized the flexibility inherent in the ASCM through Article 27 of the 
agreement. Article 27 makes provision for special and differential treatment for developing and 




to Belize. We also took note of Article 8 of the ASCM, which makes provision for the allowance 
of non-actionable subsidies, even though Article 31 of the ASCM renders the flexibility inherent 
in Article 8 of the ASCM irrelevant and its states the expiry of its provisions.  
 We note that for Belize, there is no overt flexibility for its commitment as the provisions 
of the ASCM stands. However, the removal of the export contingency in the new DPA offers a 
glimpse into how Belize could further its industrial promotion objectives with the existing benefits 
it provides under its programmes. The declaration of an economic sector as a national champion 
or priority by Belize, as one of the qualifying conditions to confer subsidy to firms.  The sector 
need not be a non-exporting sector, in fact, the declared sector could be an exporting one, and the 
program would not be in violation of the ASCM provisions. Of course, another member States can 
challenge the DPA program still according to Article 5 and 6 of the ASCM. We believe such legal 
challenge is less likely for Belize given its limited supply capacity and tight fiscal wiggle room to 
scale such benefit to the extent that can cause an injury to another country’s economic interest.   
 Belize’s desires of increased economic growth are promising, and it can be achieved with 
appropriate industrial strategies to support sectors with the most potential to anchor the economy. 
The size of Belize’s economy and population mandates that the country look less towards what 
more it can consume from the world, but how much more it can sell to the global economy 
leveraging its market access to the EU and the United States.  
 As such, Belize must continue to expand its supply capacity to meet the demands of the 
global economy through continuous support to its industries. Notwithstanding the difficulties of 
actively supporting industrial development, measures to enhance the overall competitiveness of 
industries should explored by Belize. A deliberate expansion of education investment could ensure 




not be deemed an actionable subsidy as it would not be specific nor contingent on export 
performance. Rather, it improves the human capital of the country. A concerted investment in 
trade-enhancing infrastructure, such as a more efficient logistics system would reduce the overall 
business cost for businesses, whether or not they are exporters. While our suggested efforts are 
non-targeted, and some might suggest its lack of potency, ultimately, we believe truly competitive 
firms would see enhanced efficiency in their operations as a result of our recommended 
investments.   
Finally, since the tide of non-reciprocity at the multilateral level is coming to an end, Belize 
must begin preparing its economy for possible competition on its domestic market with more 
efficient international producers. We note that the heightened fear of domestic industry decline by 
import sensitive local industries. Belize being a very small market, it is unlikely to attract much 
attention for take-over from multinational corporations. On the other hand, Belize’s extensive 
market access via its trade agreements makes it attractive to export-oriented businesses looking 
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